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Of Swords, Shields, and a Gun to the Head: Coercing 
Individuals, But Not States 
Aviam Soifer 
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, 
and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all 
declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean 
the same thing. 
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which 
the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf de-
nounces him for the same act as a destroyer of liberty . . . .1 
 
 
Mrs. Premise [on the phone with Mrs. Sartre]: When will [Jean-Paul 
Sartre] be free? . . . Oooooh. Ha ha ha ha. (To Mrs. Conclusion) She 
says he’s spent the last sixty years trying to work that one out.2 
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 1. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 18, 1864), in 7 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 301−02 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 2. Mrs. Premise and Mrs. Conclusion Visit Jean-Paul Sartre, MONTYPYTHON.NET, 
http://www.montypython.net/scripts/premise.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2016); see also Monty Python 
– Mrs. Premise and Mrs. Conclusion, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=crIJvcWkVcs 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2016). My brother, Eldon, brought this exchange to my attention. Eldon teaches 
philosophy and he is one of the few philosophers to be connected specifically to the insights of The 
Simpsons. See Jason Holt, Springfield Hypocrisy, in THE SIMPSONS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE D’OH! 
OF HOMER 179, 185 (William Irwin et al. eds., 2001) (citing Béla Szabados & Eldon Soifer, Hypoc-
risy After Aristotle, 37 DIALOGUE 545, 563 (1998)). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This excellent Symposium specifically celebrated the sesquicenten-
nial year of the amendment that President Lincoln proclaimed to be “a 
King’s cure for all the evils”3 of slavery. Many of the participants have 
been fortunate to take part in a series of additional symposia on Thir-
teenth Amendment issues; some of us have focused on the historical con-
text as well as the current and future implications of this amendment 
which “[b]y its own unaided force it abolished slavery, and established 
universal freedom.”4 Others pounded computer keyboards to illuminate 
the statutory framework that Congress established, the framework based 
on the Thirteenth Amendment and prior to passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.5 And, to the credit of the organizers of this Symposium, its 
call for articles yielded impressive work by several newcomers to Thir-
teenth Amendment issues. 
This Article begins with a brief reprise of what should be a textual 
“gotcha” about the Enforcement Clauses of the post-Civil War Amend-
ments—if our current Supreme Court Justices actually cared about origi-
nal texts, originalism, or a combination of the two. Next, the Article fo-
cuses on the gnarled issue of “coercion.” It argues that, contrary to a 
great deal of Anglo-American legal doctrine, coercion is best understood 
along a spectrum rather than as a binary phenomenon. Coercion is actual-
                                                     
 3. Abraham Lincoln, Response to a Serenade (Feb. 1, 1865), in 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 254 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). The day after passage of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment on January 31, 1865, Lincoln told a celebratory crowd gathered at the White House that the 
amendment “winds the whole thing up” as he embraced “this great moral victory.” Id. at 255−56. 
Lincoln’s uncharacteristically active role in lobbying for the Thirteenth Amendment is captured well 
in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s book Team of Rivals (2005) and, in somewhat exaggerated form, in 
Steven Spielberg’s movie Lincoln (2012). 
 4. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
 5. Actually, I began this effort many years before personal computers were in use. See, e.g., 
Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger’s History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 
(1979); see also Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: 
United States Supreme Court, 1888−1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249 (1987) [hereinafter Soifer, The 
Paradox]; Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916 (1987). 
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ly much contested and highly contextual across many legal categories. 
Federal coercion—also described as commandeering6 or dragooning7—
has become a particular constitutional focus in recent decades. 
Part II briefly describes the Court’s particular concern regarding the 
need for agreements by states to be intelligent, voluntary, and uncoerced, 
which entails maintaining the equal dignity of all states and state offi-
cials. It compares this politesse, generally proclaimed to be anchored in 
federalism,8 with the Court’s considerably more relaxed acceptance of 
federal coercive power over individuals. 
Part III considers the jagged edges around decisions about what 
could or should qualify as “voluntary or involuntary service or labor of 
any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or other-
wise.”9 Starting with the recognition, at one end of the spectrum, that any 
contract could be considered coercive, Part III briefly compares and con-
trasts the doctrine of duress in mainstream standard contract law doctrine 
with the historic evisceration of the very concept of freedom from volun-
tary peonage. This evisceration was perpetrated by U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices as well as by innumerable employers imposing harsh realpolitik 
as a devastating form of law in action.10 
It is thus noteworthy that even in the course of the Supreme Court’s 
infamously crabbed description of what civil rights should entail in the 
Civil Rights Cases,11 Justice Bradley’s majority opinion also proclaimed: 
Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various 
cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper 
modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legisla-
tion may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment 
is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding 
                                                     
 6. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914 (1997). 
 7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 
plurality opinion). 
 8. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 176 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-dignity-of-the-south (“The idea that states have dignity, and that 
this dignity has some constitutional force—although not, to be sure, because of any specific piece of 
constitutional text—emerged as an important theme in the ‘new’ federalism jurisprudence of the 
1990s.”); Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699 (2002) (describing the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s “metafederalism”). 
 9. Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, ch. 187, §1, 14 Stat. 546, 546 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 
(2012)). 
 10. See, e.g., PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY 19–42 (1972); DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE 
WHEEL OF SERVITUDE 44–62 (1978); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 
70–72, 82–118 (2d rev. ed. 1966); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme 
Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 648–
49, 710–11 (1982). 
 11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary ser-
vitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.12 
In looking more deeply into the Thirteenth Amendment and statutes 
based upon it, I found that on the last day of the lame-duck 39th Con-
gress, the authors of what became the Fourteenth Amendment passed the 
Peonage Abolition Act of 1867. They did so on March 2, 1867, the same 
day that Congress divided the South into five districts and sent in federal 
troops.13 
I. CONGRESS’S ENFORCEMENT POWER 
With adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, “[a] structurally pro-
slavery Constitution became, in a flash, stunningly antislavery.”14 For a 
myriad of reasons, for the first time in American history, Congress also 
added a clause giving Congress enforcement power. Elsewhere, I have 
reviewed the historic context for how and why Congress decided to use 
its new enforcement power to override President Johnson’s veto of the 
1866 Civil Rights Act—the first time Congress exercised such power 
regarding a major legislation—and how and why Congress decided to 
pass the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867.15 But a basic logical point mer-
its emphasis here. 
The Thirteenth Amendment states: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction. 
                                                     
 12. Id. at 20. Bradley added a broad description of Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment, pointing out that the amendment not only nullified 
all State laws which establish or uphold slavery. But it has a reflex character also, estab-
lishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States; 
and it is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate 
legislation, clothes Congress with the power to pass all laws necessary and proper for 
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States . . . . 
Id. This broad view, and a great deal of surrounding evidence, should go far toward answering any 
question as to whether the rights anchored in the Thirteenth Amendment give rise to a private right 
of action, a federal courts issue that surely never occurred to be a problem in the years immediately 
after the Civil War. 
 13. An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States (Military Recon-
struction Act), ch. 153, § 1, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
 14. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 360 (2005). 
 15. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights: The Floor and More, in THE 
PROMISES OF LIBERTY 196 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010); Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Pater-
nalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607 
(2012). 
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Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.16 
On January 3, 1867, the 39th Congress returned for its lame-duck session 
following the 1866 congressional election, which had turned out to be a 
disaster for President Johnson and an overwhelming victory for the Re-
publicans.17 Radical Republican leaders Senator Charles Sumner of Mas-
sachusetts and Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania imme-
diately gave speeches decrying, respectively, the peonage of Mexicans 
and Indians in the Southwest and the failure to protect “loyal brethren at 
the South, whether they are black or white, whether they go there from 
the North or are natives of the South . . . from the barbarians who are 
daily murdering them.”18 By March 2, Congress had decided to send 
troops to protect those “loyal brethren at the South,” and to enact the Pe-
onage Abolition Act, which provided: 
[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the system 
known as peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and the same 
is hereby abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New 
Mexico, or in any other Territory  or State of the United States; and 
all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Terri-
tory of New Mexico, or of any other Territory  or State of the Unit-
ed States, which have heretofore established, maintained, or en-
forced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to 
establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary 
or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquida-
tion of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, be, and the same are 
hereby, declared null and void.19 
As it might have been put at the time, it cannot be gainsaid that the 39th 
Congress thus used its enforcement power to go beyond the rights pro-
tected in Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment. By adding a statutory 
prohibition of “voluntary” service to the Amendment’s explicit prohibi-
tion of “involuntary service,” the 39th Congress clearly believed that it 
possessed the power to protect rights in addition to those protected ex-
plicitly within the amendment’s text. 
It should be clear that such a “latitudinarian” approach to the power 
granted to Congress through the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments comes much closer to the view of 
the extent of Congress’s enforcement power taken by the Warren Court 
                                                     
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added). 
 17. Soifer, Federal Protection, supra note 15, at 1615–19. 
 18. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 239–40, 251 (1867). 
 19. Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, ch. 187, §1, 14 Stat. 546, 546 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1994 (2012)) (emphasis added). 
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than it is to the crabbed view repeatedly embraced by the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts. It finds direct echoes in South Carolina v. Katzenbach20 
and Katzenbach v. Morgan;21 but, this approach has been firmly rejected 
in more recent decisions such as City of Boerne v. Flores,22 United States 
v. Morrison,23 and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett.24 The Court’s recent devotion to the limits of federalism and to 
the sovereignty of the states aggressively protects states’ rights from 
Congress’s authority in ways that undoubtedly would have surprised the 
congressional authors of the Civil War Amendments. 
As the next Part makes clear, the Court now believes that it must in-
tervene if an unstated (and often directly misstated) deep structure of 
federalism seems to a majority of the Justices to be inconsistent with the 
powers granted to Congress in Article 1 of the Constitution, even as 
broadly supplemented by the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
II. OVERWHELMING THE FREE WILL OF THE STATES 
A. Social Security v. Obamacare 
It is a commonplace idea that the Court, beginning in 1937, 
changed course dramatically and began to uphold extensive use of con-
gressional power of the sort it had been in the practice of invalidating for 
many years. One of many examples of such a “switch in time that saved 
nine”25 was the Court’s decision to deny constitutional challenges to the 
Social Security Act of 1935. 
The Court emphatically rejected a claim that the tax and credit ele-
ments of the original Social Security Act’s unemployment compensation 
provisions involved “the coercion of the states in contravention of the 
Tenth Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal form of gov-
ernment.”26 Justice Cardozo’s 5–4 majority opinion emphasized the na-
tional scope of the unemployment problem during the Great Depression 
and seemed to mock the claim that the statute’s “dominant end . . . is to 
drive the state Legislatures under the whip of economic pressure into the 
                                                     
 20. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 21. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 23. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 24. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 25. A popular, but contested, story is that Justice Owen Roberts reversed his previous relatively 
conservative course and voted to uphold a minimum wage law in the face of President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s plan to pack the Court with the President’s supporters. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A 
Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 622 (1994); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. 
Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 70 (2010). 
 26. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937). 
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enactment of unemployment compensation laws at the bidding of the 
central government.”27 Rather, Cardozo wrote: 
[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to 
plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doc-
trine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which 
choice becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a 
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a 
working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.28 
Cardozo conceded that there could be times when a statute might “call 
for a surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi-sovereign 
existence,”29 but he left drawing “the outermost line” to “the wisdom of 
the future.”30 
Chief Justice Roberts clearly believed that the wisdom of the future 
required drawing just such a line in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).31 Congress’s financial inducement to the 
states to participate in the Affordable Care Act, said the Court, “is much 
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”32 
Because the states could lose all their federal Medicaid funding, they 
faced “economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option 
but to acquiesce.”33 The Court also felt compelled to protect the states 
from federal intrusion on their police power, anchored in the Commerce 
Clause, because “[a]ny police power to regulate individuals as such, as 
opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States.”34 Ironically, of 
course, Chief Justice Roberts nonetheless managed to stitch together 
enough votes to uphold the mandate requiring individuals to participate 
in the Affordable Care Act by labeling that form of purported coercion a 
tax penalty, within the broad scope of Congress’s taxing power.35 
                                                     
 27. Id. at 587. 
 28. Id. at 589−90. In a companion case, Cardozo again wrote for the Court upholding the old 
age benefit provisions of the 1935 Social Security Act. He emphasized the problem states would face 
of what we would now call a “race to the bottom” in which states that did provide benefits would 
find that their programs would become “a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging 
them to migrate and seek a haven of repose. Only a power that is national can serve the interests of 
all.” Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937). 
 29. Steward, 301 U.S. at 593. 
 30. Id. at 591. 
 31. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012). 
 32. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
 33. Id. at 2605. Roberts also emphasized that there was a large amount of money involved and 
that, in his view, the changes required in Affordable Care Act regarding Medicaid funding constitut-
ed a retroactive change that the states could not have anticipated and which, if upheld, could force 
the states to continue to accept new conditions tied to the funding they accepted. See id. at 2604. 
 34. Id. at 2591. 
 35. Id. at 2598. Consider also the sequence reaching toward socialism in several Dormant 
Commerce Clause decisions involving solid waste disposal. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
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B. Freeing the States from Federal Coercion 
NFIB was hardly alone among recent decisions in its emphasis on 
the importance of assuring states that the Court would intervene to pro-
tect their autonomy. Justice O’Connor triggered the successful modern 
state autonomy doctrine writing for the majority in New York v. United 
States.36 In the course of invalidating the “take title” aspect of the com-
plex Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985, 
O’Connor endorsed the Court’s earlier recognition that “[t]he Tenth 
Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is 
not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which . . . is 
essentially a tautology.”37 Nonetheless, the Court declared that even the 
“consent” of state officials could not validate what the Justices them-
selves perceived to be unconstitutional federal coercion.38 
“In the end,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “the [Constitutional] Con-
vention opted for a Constitution in which Congress would exercise its 
legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over States.”39 
The Court sought to limit the power of Congress to “commandeer” the 
states, and emphasized the idea that “the Constitution divides authority 
between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. 
State sovereignty is not just an end in itself . . . .”40 
A number of more recent and much more far-reaching decisions 
have indeed regarded state sovereignty as an end in itself. The Court now 
has repeatedly elevated both state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment 
over individual rights, whether protecting state officials from being 
commandeered to keep gun registration records41 or invalidating Con-
                                                                                                                       
437 U.S. 617 (1978), New Jersey’s claim understandably worrying about its environment fell victim 
to the free flow of commerce; similarly, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 
383 (1994), a majority was unwilling to accept even a limited public-private partnership. Yet in 
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007), 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion stressed the public ownership of the waste processing fa-
cility and fit its compulsory use within the acceptable realm of governmental “responsibility of pro-
tecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.” Id. at 342. 
 36. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (construing Low–Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985, Pub. L. 99–240, 99 Stat. 1842). Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist had tried earlier to limit 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
holding that if the Court determined that a federal statute interfered with traditional, integral, or 
essential state functions, the statute would be unconstitutional. Rehnquist lost Justice Blackmun’s 
vote, however, and thus his majority, less than a decade later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 37. New York, 505 U.S. at 156–57. 
 38. Id. at 182 (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the de-
parture from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”). 
 39. Id. at 165. 
 40. Id. at 181. 
 41. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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gress’s effort to afford additional protection for victims of sexual vio-
lence—even if a substantial majority of the states supported the measure 
and filed an amicus brief to that effect.42 And the sword and shield that 
were meant to guarantee protection to individuals through the post-Civil 
War Amendments and federal statutes based upon them have long since 
been shelved on behalf of states’ rights. 
These decisions are a far cry even from what then-Associate Justice 
Rehnquist said for the Court in the 1970s. Though the Court expanded 
the reach of state sovereign immunity in Edelman v. Jordan,43 for exam-
ple, Rehnquist’s majority opinion embraced the “noble lie”44 of Ex parte 
Young45 and said of that decision: “This holding has permitted the Civil 
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than 
merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect.”46 
Writing for the Court a few years later in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,47 
Rehnquist further developed the theme of sword-as-well-as-shield in the 
post-Civil War Amendments as he proclaimed, “As ratified by the States 
after the Civil War, [the Fourteenth] Amendment quite clearly contem-
plates limitations on their authority.”48 Indeed, his Bitzer opinion stressed 
the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause 
through which Congress sought to guarantee protection if states failed in 
their duties to individuals, which the Court held Connecticut had done 
when it distinguished between men and women in its state pension 
scheme.49 As he broadly construed Title VII, Rehnquist stated: “The sub-
                                                     
 42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Justice Souter, dissenting with Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, noted that the National Association of Attorneys General supported 
the Act unanimously, and the Attorneys General from thirty-eight states urged Congress to enact the 
Civil Rights Remedy. Id. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, thirty-six states and the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in these cases, and only 
one state took respondents’ side. Id. at 654. 
 43. 415 U.S. 651 (1973). 
 44. See Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spend-
ing Power, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 833 n.7 (1986); Larry Yackle, Young Again, 35 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 51 (2013). 
 45. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 46. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664. Rehnquist may have been channeling Justice Jackson, for whom 
he served as a law clerk starting in 1952. Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of 
Supreme Court, Is Dead at 80, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/09/04/politics/william-h-rehnquist-chief-justice-of-supreme-court-is-dead-at-80.html?_r=0. 
Jackson’s opinion for the Court in Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), struck down a conviction 
for fraud allegedly perpetrated by Emanuel Pollock for accepting five dollars without doing the 
required work—and thus being subject to a fine of one hundred dollars and sixty days in jail—and 
declared that through passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Peonage Abolition Act, “Con-
gress thus raised both a shield and a sword against forced labor because of debt.” Id. at 8; see also 
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). 
 47. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
 48. Id. at 453. 
 49. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 209–10 (1974). 
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stantive provisions [of the Fourteenth Amendment] are by express terms 
directed at the States. Impressed upon them by those provisions are du-
ties with respect to their treatment of private individuals.[50] Standing 
behind these imperatives is Congress’ power to ‘enforce’ them ‘by ap-
propriate legislation.’”51 Thus in 1976, Rehnquist could confidently note 
that the Fourteenth Amendment sword had carved congressional power 
out of state authority. He emphasized Ex parte Virginia’s “early recogni-
tion of this shift in the federal-state balance” and he insisted that recogni-
tion of this change “has been carried forward by more recent decisions of 
this Court.”52 
Shelby County v. Holder53 is the latest stark example of the Court’s 
aggressive stance toward Congress’s efforts to provide federal protec-
tion. Out of its concern for the dignity of the states, the majority opinion 
                                                     
 50. For a sharp contrast, see Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago Cnty. Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (no state obligation to protect a four-year-
old boy from savage beatings by his father because “nothing in the language of the Due Process 
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion 
by private actors”). See generally Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the “Free World” 
of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513 (1989). 
 51. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added). Rehnquist went on to rely heavily on Ex 
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), noting that in that decision, “The Court first observed that these 
Amendments ‘were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States and 
enlargements of the power of Congress.’” Id. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345). He 
proceeded to quote Ex parte Virginia at considerable length: 
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to 
a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, 
and to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be executive, 
legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can 
be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empow-
ered Congress to enact. . . . It is said the selection of jurors for her courts and the admin-
istration of her laws belong to each State; that they are her rights. This is true in the gen-
eral. But in exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the Fed-
eral Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can 
she deny to the general government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though 
they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had 
not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government in-
volves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved 
out of them. 
 The argument in support of the petition for a habeas corpus ignores entirely the 
power conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. Were it not for the fifth 
section of that amendment, there might be room for argument that the first section is only 
declaratory of the moral duty of the State . . . . But the Constitution now expressly gives 
authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class 
of cases; but within its limits it is complete. 
Id. at 454–55 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346–48) (first emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 455 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) and Mitchum v. 
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1972)). 
 53. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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by Chief Justice Roberts distorted both constitutional text and history in 
remarkable ways in the course of striking down Congress’s renewal of 
the preclearance requirement in Section 4b of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. First, for example, Roberts proclaimed: “Indeed, the Constitution 
provides that all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Govern-
ment are reserved to the States or citizens. Amdt. 10.”54 But the Tenth 
Amendment does not say this.55 In fact, precisely because the powers of 
the federal government were limited to what had been “expressly grant-
ed,” James Madison led a successful fight to eliminate “expressly” from 
the text of the Tenth Amendment.56 
Next, not only did Roberts’s paean to state sovereignty and the deep 
structural values of federalism lack a textual basis, it also entirely ig-
nored the changes in federalism wrought by the Civil War. In addition, 
the Court’s new emphasis on the doctrine of “equal sovereignty” merits 
close attention. The initial source for the phrase and the doctrine is Coyle 
v. Smith,57 a decision written by Justice Lurton that allowed Oklahoma to 
break its “irrevocable” promise, made in 1906 as a condition for entering 
the Union, not to move the state capitol from Guthrie to Oklahoma City 
before 1913.58 Now that Oklahoma had become a state, said the Court, it 
                                                     
 54. Id. at 2623. 
 55. The Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. X. 
 56. See, e.g., THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 
683 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (Madison “[o]bjected to this amendment, because it was impossible 
to confine a government to the exercise of express powers, there must necessarily be admitted pow-
ers by implication, unless the constitution descended to recount every minutiae. [Madison] remem-
bered the word ‘expressly’ had been moved in the convention of Virginia, by the opponents to the 
ratification, and after full and fair discussion was given up by them, and the system allowed to retain 
its present form.”); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, 
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1899–
1902 (2008). 
 57. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). Justices McKenna and Holmes dissented, without opinion. Id. at 580. 
 58. The term “irrevocable” occurred in both the territorial and congressional sides of the pre-
statehood agreement. See CLINTON O. BUNN & WILLIAM C. BUNN, CONSTITUTION AND ENABLING 
ACT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ANNOTATED AND INDEXED 137 (1907) (“Sec. 497.—Enabling 
Act Accepted by Ordinance Irrevocable.—Be it Ordained by the Constitutional Convention for the 
proposed State of Oklahoma, that said Constitutional Convention do, by this ordinance irrevocable, 
accept the terms and conditions [of the admission act].”); Oklahoma Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, 
ch. 3335, § 22, 34 Stat. 267, 278 (“That the constitutional convention provided for herein shall, by 
ordinance irrevocable, accept the terms and conditions of this Act.”); Oklahoma Enabling Act § 2 
(“The capital of [Oklahoma] shall temporarily be at the city of Guthrie, in the present Territory of 
Oklahoma and shall not be changed therefrom previous to [1913] . . . .”). The Oklahomans who 
nonetheless declined to follow the terms of the admission act as to where to locate their capital con-
tinued the independent thinking, if not lawlessness, of their Sooner heritage. See 1 LUTHER B. HILL, 
A HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 258 (1910) (“Thus was created a new word in the vocabu-
lary of the English language. The man who violated the acts of Congress and the president’s procla-
mation opening Oklahoma to settlement came to be known as a ‘sooner.’”). 
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was entitled to revoke its emphatic promise. To hold otherwise would be 
to treat Oklahoma differently and less favorably than all the other 
states.59 States must equally be allowed to break their solemn promises. 
More recently, in the name of the sovereign immunity said to be an-
chored in the Eleventh Amendment and states’ rights, states can also es-
cape bad bargains unless it can be demonstrated that they fully under-
stood what the deal entailed when they had previously accepted it.60 
III. VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 
A. State Action? 
If taken seriously, the history of the Thirteenth Amendment and its 
relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment supports the argument made 
by Charles Black, with characteristic verve and eloquence, that state ac-
tion is a judicial construct that ought to be abandoned.61 Without plumb-
ing those depths now, however, it is illuminating to consider briefly the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of coercion and consent in the context of 
decisions construing the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The story of the great extent to which the Supreme Court is impli-
cated in the dismantling of the Reconstruction Era protections and the 
rise of Jim Crow has often been told, beginning with the Court’s shock-
ing opinion in Blyew v. United States.62 Blyew held that a Kentucky law 
forbidding blacks from testifying took precedence over the federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.63 Because two black witnesses to the horrific murder 
in Kentucky of several members of a black family therefore could not 
testify, there was no federal jurisdiction and the indictment had to be 
dismissed.64 
                                                     
 59. See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567–68. 
 60. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch, & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that a 
state must unequivocally waive its sovereign immunity and that Congress must unequivocally intend 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that 
the Eleventh Amendment barred retroactive benefit payments by state officials from federal-state 
benefit program). Similarly, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992), the Court 
answered its question, “How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional infringement of state 
sovereignty when state officials consented to the statute's enactment?” by surrounding New York 
with the cloak of federalism in the name of protecting individuals. It mattered not that the state of 
New York had benefitted substantially from “a compromise to which New York was a willing par-
ticipant and from which New York has reaped much benefit.” Id. 
 61. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Aviam Soifer, Charles L. Black, Jr.: Commitment, 
Connection, and the Ceaseless Quest for Justice, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 15–16 (2006). 
 62. 80 U.S. 581 (1871). 
 63. Id. at 593. 
 64. See id.; see also Soifer, Federal Protection, supra note 15, at 1620–21 (discussing Blyew). 
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Then, with the Civil Rights Cases,65 the Court explicitly began to 
leave former slaves, their allies, and their descendants to their own de-
vices. Less than eighteen years after the Thirteenth Amendment had for-
mally ended slavery, Justice Bradley’s majority opinion proclaimed that 
it was past time when a black man “takes the rank of a mere citizen, and 
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws.”66 In fact, said the Court, 
“[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground”67 to hold 
that Thirteenth Amendment protections against the badges and incidents 
of slavery could extend to prohibiting racial discrimination in places of 
public accommodation. The Court thus encouraged states to look the 
other way—or worse—as Jim Crow laws and practices gained traction. 
The “state action” requirement mandated by the Civil Rights Cases 
made it terribly easy for private citizens as well as state authorities to 
assert that sharecroppers, as well as those convicted of petty crimes who 
were leased by white employers out of confinement and off chain gangs, 
actually were the beneficiaries of a freedom of contract regime. The ac-
ceptance of voluntary peonage grew from deep roots in America’s social, 
cultural, and legal traditions.68 
B. Voluntary Servitude and the Story of Jacob 
The Hebrew Bible’s story of Jacob has been celebrated through the 
centuries because of Jacob’s persistence during his voluntary slavery. In 
order to marry Rachel, the daughter of Laban, Jacob agreed to work for 
Laban for seven years.69 Laban tricked Jacob, however, and Jacob in-
stead married Rachel’s older sister, Leah. Undeterred, Jacob toiled for 
Laban for another seven years and finally did get the chance to marry 
Rachel, too.70 
Notwithstanding the appeal of this Bible Story, the issue of agree-
ment to be a slave or a peon remains deeply troubling. Adam Smith was 
certain that “[t]he property which every man has in his own labour, as it 
is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred 
                                                     
 65. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 66. Id. at 25. 
 67. Id. at 24. 
 68. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: 
LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862–72 (1981); DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER 
(1993); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN 
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350–1870 (1991). 
 69. Genesis 29:20 (Eitz Hayim). 
 70. Genesis is succinct in explaining Jacob’s preference for Rachel, whom he had fallen in love 
with at first sight. “Leah had weak eyes; Rachel was shapely and beautiful.” Genesis 29:17. I owe 
this point to my mother, Ahuva Soifer. 
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and inviolable.”71 And John Stuart Mill asserted, “The principle of free-
dom cannot require that a man should be free not to be free.”72 Mill also 
noted, “All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the en-
forcement of restraints upon the actions of other people.”73 Yet both the-
ology and law have at times allowed and even embraced the choice of an 
individual to give up freedom for slavery or peonage. 
Many religious people justified slavery not only because it was 
rooted in the Bible,74 but also because it was an example of how the 
greater power could include a lesser power. The widespread theory was 
that slaves were captive in battle and thus could be killed. To spare them 
was therefore benign, and certainly well within the power of their cap-
tors.75 
Prior to the abolition of slavery, Lemuel Shaw, the eminent Chief 
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for thirty years, had 
decided that it would be “a denial of her freedom” not to allow the choice 
made by Betty—a young former slave who was free because she had 
been brought into Massachusetts voluntarily by her owners—to return to 
slavery and to her home and family in Tennessee.76 Southern states de-
fended slavery as preferable to the wage slavery of the North; Virginia 
even passed a statute establishing a process through which a free black 
could choose to become a slave.77 Even long after the Thirteenth 
                                                     
 71. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
55 (1863). 
 72. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 114 (Oxford University Press 1991) (1859). For an ex-
tensive discussion, see Alexander Bickel & Benno C. Schmidt, The Judiciary and Responsible Gov-
ernment, 1910-1921, in IX HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 820–907 (1984). 
 73. MILL, supra note 72, at 114. See generally JOSEPH W. SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT 
REGULATION: THE HIDDEN LESSONS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2015). 
 74. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS   
9–19 (1975) (exploring tensions between moral and formal law and between natural law and positive 
law); Kevin Giles, The Biblical Argument for Slavery: Can the Bible Mislead? A Case Study in 
Hermeneutics, 66 EVANGELICAL Q. 3 (1994). 
 75. See JEAN ALLAIN, THE LAW AND SLAVERY: PROHIBITING HUMAN EXPLOITATION 4–5 
(2015). 
 76. Betty’s Case, 20 Monthly L. Rep. 455 (Mass. 1857) (unreported); see Aviam Soifer, Con-
strained Choices: New England Slavery Decisions in the Antebellum Era, in FREEDOM’S 
CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.-CANADIAN BORDERLANDS IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 173, 188–90 
(Tony Freyer & Lyndsay Campbell eds., 2011); see also Soifer, Status, supra note 5, at 1916–30 
(discussing Betty’s Case). See generally STEINFELD, supra note 68; EDLIE L. WONG, NEITHER 
FUGITIVE NOR FREE: ATLANTIC SLAVERY, FREEDOM SUITS, AND THE LEGAL CULTURE OF TRAVEL 
(2009). 
 77. See, e.g., THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 41 & n.82 (1965) 
(citing Virginia statute). Massachusetts included a similar provision in its first codification of law, 
the Body of Liberties, in 1641 and later broadened the opportunity to consent to be a slave. See 
GEORGE H. MOORE, NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN MASSACHUSETTS 12–15 (1866). Pride 
of place for the formal abolition of slavery in the United States belongs to Vermont, but even the 
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Amendment, however, the Supreme Court repeatedly allowed individu-
als to be the victims of their own bargains in contexts all too reminiscent 
of slavery or peonage. This proved to be a key element of depredations 
imposed in the name of freedom of contract and an allegedly free market. 
In Robertson v. Baldwin,78 for example, Justice Brown’s majority 
opinion upheld both state and federal incarceration of three white sailors 
who jumped ship and refused to follow orders. Locking the sailors up 
was for their own good, Brown explained, and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment had not interfered with an individual’s freedom to “contract for the 
surrender of his personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized 
purpose,”79 even if the sailor’s contract thereafter meant subordinating 
his will. Two years earlier, the Court also rejected a badges and incidents 
of slavery argument premised on the Thirteenth Amendment in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.80 Similarly through Justice Brown, the majority found the 
Thirteenth Amendment irrelevant to Homer Plessy’s attack on segregated 
railroad carriages because the amendment had abolished only slavery, 
bondage, and “the control of the labor and services of one man for the 
benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his 
own person, property, and services.”81 
Within a few years, the Court boldly narrowed the definition of pe-
onage even more. It overturned that great rarity, a successful peonage 
prosecution, this one of a brutal overseer and his minions for bringing 
two black workers back to Georgia from Florida. The two black workers 
were taken at gunpoint, placed in handcuffs, and returned to the awful 
working conditions involved in the production of turpentine.82 Justice 
Brewer’s majority opinion explained that peonage meant only “a status 
or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the 
peon to the master.”83 
                                                                                                                       
document that did so, the Vermont Constitution of 1777, explicitly continued to permit consensual 
slavery. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. I. 
 78. 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
 79. Id. at 280. Because the Court considered sailors to be in particular need of paternalistic care 
as they were “deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited to 
ordinary adults,” it was held to be well within Congress’s authority to extend “the protection of the 
law in the same sense in which minors and wards are entitled to the protection of parents and guardi-
ans.” See id. at 287. In his ringing dissent, the first Justice Harlan rejected the idea that protecting 
seamen could extend to the use of force to compel them to render personal service and raised the 
specter of future advertisements for fugitive seamen. See id. at 303 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 80. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 81. Id. at 542. 
 82. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
 83. Id. at 215. Justice Brewer held that debt was the “basal” condition, necessary for any legal 
definition of peonage. This, of course, directly contradicted the definition promulgated by Congress 
in the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867. Justice Harlan filed another opinion, concurring in part. Id. at 
222–23 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The following year, the Court went even further as it echoed and 
extended the theme of the Civil Rights Cases. To allow blacks to invoke 
federal protection when a mob terrorized them so that they could not 
work in an Arkansas lumber mill was to ignore the fact that the Thir-
teenth Amendment was “not an attempt to commit that race to the care of 
the nation.”84 Arkansas law would have to suffice, Justice Brewer wrote 
for the Court in Hodges v. United States, because the Thirteenth 
Amendment could not reach wrongs perpetrated against persons who 
were not shown in the record to be slaves or the descendants of slaves.85 
To determine otherwise would be to treat blacks as “wards of the Na-
tion.”86 Justice Harlan again dissented vigorously against this denial of 
national protection for “millions of citizen-laborers of African descent” 
who were denied the right to earn a living solely because of their race.87 
Harlan considered this a direct betrayal of the promise of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which had “destroyed slavery and all its incidents and 
badges, and established freedom,”88 and which had “an affirmative oper-
ation the moment it was adopted.”89 
In a sense, decisions such as Robertson, Clyatt, and Hodges could 
serve as further examples of the kind of cognitive dissonance Robert 
Cover described in discussing judges who protested too much that their 
hands were tied as they returned fugitive slaves to slavery.90 But such 
decisions also underscore the jagged nature of judicial resistance to pa-
ternalism, particularly during an era that celebrated the glory of freedom 
of contract in tandem with obeisance to the values of federalism and re-
spect for state sovereignty. Blacks were told early and often that they 
should look to the states for protection, but not to Congress or the federal 
courts.91 
                                                     
 84. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906). 
 85. Id. at 19. Justice Brewer claimed that there was a relevant syllogism: because Chinese 
workers still were required to carry certificates, as free blacks had been required to do during slav-
ery, the Thirteenth Amendment did not protect any of those to whom Congress had granted citizen-
ship at the end of the Civil War. Thus, Brewer argued, Congress had assumed of black citizens that 
“thereby in the long run their best interests would be subserved, they taking their chances with other 
citizens in the states where they should make their homes.” Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. at 20. The Hodges decision was formally overruled in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968). 
 87. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 37 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 27. 
 89. Id. at 29. Justice Day joined Harlan’s dissent. Id. at 20. 
 90. COVER, supra note 74, at 9–19. 
 91. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 
U.S. 426 (1903) (Holmes’s first U.S. Supreme Court opinion); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
Holmes’s majority opinion rejected a black man’s equitable challenge to an Alabama statute that 
grandfathered veterans of all wars, including those on either side in the Civil War, and imposed 
stringent registration requirements for new voters. See Giles, 189 U.S. at 486–88. Holmes wrote, 
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C. Tracking Justice Holmes 
By 1911, the Court had begun to question its faith in freedom of 
contract and in state law. The well-known decision in Bailey v. Ala-
bama92 exemplifies this change. Though both Justices Hughes for the 
majority and Holmes in dissent claimed that the fact that the case arose 
in Alabama made no difference to them,93 both men also claimed to be 
taking the context into account. For Hughes, writing his first major opin-
ion on the Court, the prima facie case of criminal fraud established under 
an amended Alabama statute governing breach of contract had become 
“an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against the poor and 
ignorant, its most likely victims.”94 This criminal law presumption 
against a black farm worker who abandoned his year-long contract after 
working for a little over a month was invalid under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which prohibited “control by which the personal service of 
one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit.”95 
Holmes’s dissent accused the majority of assuming that Alabama 
juries would be prejudiced; he claimed further that, to the contrary, it was 
appropriate for Alabama to leave such matters to juries because of “their 
experience as men of the world.”96 In characteristic pithy fashion, 
Holmes also made the point that “[t]he [Thirteenth] Amendment does not 
outlaw contracts for labor.”97 Strikingly, Holmes summarized his posi-
tion in moral terms: “Breach of a legal contract without excuse is wrong 
conduct, even if the contract is for labor; and if a state adds to civil liabil-
ity a criminal liability to fine, it simply intensifies the legal motive for 
doing right, it does not make the laborer a slave.”98 
                                                                                                                       
“Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the court, it seems to us 
that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.” Id. at 488. Justices Brewer 
and Harlan wrote dissents, id. at 493, 488, and Justice Brown dissented without opinion, id. at 493. 
 92. Bailey v. Alabama (Bailey II), 219 U.S. 219 (1911). In the same case three years earlier, 
Holmes wrote for the Court in rejecting the attempt to “take a short cut” to get the case before the 
Supreme Court, over dissents by Harlan and Day. Bailey v. Alabama (Bailey I), 211 U.S. 452, 455 
(1908). 
 93. Bailey II, 219 U.S. at 231 (“No question of a sectional character is presented, and we may 
view the legislation in the same manner as if it had been enacted in New York or in Idaho.”); id. at 
245 (“We all agree that this case is to be considered and decided in the same way as if it arose in 
Idaho or New York.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 245. 
 95. Id. at 241. 
 96. Id. at 248. 
 97. Id. at 246. 
 98. Id. Holmes’s concern about contract breach as “wrong conduct” here sharply contrasts with 
his hard-nosed position regarding contract breach in his book, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW (1881), and in his essay, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457 (1897), as well as in his usual jaded embrace of life’s struggles. 
804 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:787 
Holmes is generally credited as the first American legal expert to 
suggest that a breach of contract might be desirable in some situations, 
particularly in terms of economic efficiency.99 He repeatedly made the 
further point that morality ought not to play a role in legal analysis,100 yet 
this statement of an unexcused contract breach as “wrong contract” 
seems to have been generally overlooked.  And in his characteristic suc-
cinct manner, Holmes also pointed out that even when faced with the 
credible threat, “Your money or your life,” an individual still has a 
choice.101 
In the course of two Supreme Court decisions in 1911, Coyle v. 
Smith held that Oklahoma was free to breach its “irrevocable” promise, 
yet Holmes urged that Alonzo Bailey could not breach his contract un-
less he could convince a jury of the merits of his particular decision.102 
To Hughes and the majority in Bailey, however, it mattered that Ala-
bama’s criminal breach presumption primarily affected “poor” and “ig-
norant” farm workers.103 
                                                     
 99. Cf. Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1739 
n.33 (2012) (“The idea that contractual duties are disjunctive duties to perform or pay is usually 
associated with Holmes.”). 
 100. E.g., HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, supra note 98, at 145 (“As the law, on the one 
hand, allows certain harms to be inflicted irrespective of the moral condition of him who inflicts 
them, so, at the other extreme, it may on grounds of policy throw the absolute risk of certain transac-
tions on the person engaging in them, irrespective of blameworthiness in any sense.”); Holmes, Jr., 
The Path of the Law, supra note 98, at 464 (“I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger, 
both to speculation and to practice, of confounding morality with law, and the trap which legal lan-
guage lays for us on that side of our way. For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a 
gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words 
adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We should lose the 
fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by ridding 
ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much in the clearness of our thought.”). 
But note his policy-based yet also somewhat moralistic preference regarding adverse possession 
within this essay. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, supra note 98, at 476–77. 
 101. See Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, supra note 98, at 47 (“[E]ven the deliberate taking 
of life will not be punished when it is the only way of saving one’s own. This principle is not so 
clearly established as that next to be mentioned; but it has the support of very great authority. If that 
is the law, it must go on one of two grounds, either that self-preference is proper in the case sup-
posed, or that, even if it is improper, the law cannot prevent it by punishment, because a threat of 
death at some future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to make a man choose death 
now in order to avoid the threat.”); cf. Your Money or Your Life, YOUTUBE (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tVzdUczMT0 (skit from “The Jack Benny Program”). 
 102. See Bailey II, 219 U.S. at 248–49. 
 103. Id. at 245. The Progressive movement muckrakers who celebrated the Bailey II decision 
nonetheless denigrated Bailey himself. See, e.g., Ray Stannard Baker, A Pawn in the Struggle for 
Freedom, 72 AM. MAG. 608, 608 (1911) (“However you will probably not be able to distinguish him 
from a thousand—or a million—other black men whose backs are bent daily to the heaviest burdens 
of the South. Look well at the dull black face and you will see there the unmistakable marks of igno-
rance, inertia, irresponsibility.”); Deathblow to Peonage System, NEW YORK AGE, Jan. 19, 1911, at 8 
(describing Bailey as a cipher who was “last heard from slinging hash at club house, caring not 
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When the Court a few years later invalidated a test case regarding 
the widespread convict lease system in United States v. Reynolds,104 
Holmes reluctantly concurred after repeating his objections to the Bailey 
decision.105 Holmes now conceded that “impulsive people with little in-
telligence or foresight may be expected to lay hold of anything that af-
fords a relief from present pain, even though it will cause greater trouble 
by and by.”106 As C. Wright Mills more graciously made the point some 
years later, “Each day men sell little pieces of themselves in order to try 
to buy them back each night and week end . . . .”107 
D. Permissible Coercion 
By 1916, the Court made it clear in a unanimous opinion that the 
long tradition of mandatory roadwork did not offend the Thirteenth 
Amendment.108 Two years later, the Court simply declared that a chal-
lenge to the World War I military draft as a form of involuntary servitude 
was “refuted by its mere statement.”109 Further, in the wake of that war, 
the Court upheld rent control laws in Washington, D.C. and New York 
City in companion decisions written by Justice Holmes. 
In his lead opinion in Block v. Hirsh,110 Holmes stressed the pres-
sure put on available housing by the growth of the federal government 
during the war, and he accepted the claim that the housing shortage 
posed an ongoing problem that government had the authority to meet.111 
He also maintained that the Court should not address the wisdom of the 
rent control measure, and that the rent control scheme had a time limit 
and a mechanism in place to ascertain whether rents were reasonable.112 
Holmes wrote, “The general proposition to be maintained is that circum-
stances have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia 
with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law.”113 In addi-
tion, he warned: “The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to 
                                                                                                                       
which way the winds of court blew, so they robbed him not of his good meals and freedom to break 
contracts whenever he listed”). 
 104. 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
 105. Id. at 150 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. 
 107. C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR 237 (1951). 
 108. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916). Justice McReynolds, who was to become an out-
spoken champion of freedom of contract, explained for the unanimous Court that “[t]he great pur-
pose in view [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was liberty under the protection of effective govern-
ment, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.” Id. at 333. 
 109. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). 
 110. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
 111. See id. at 154–56. 
 112. Id. at 156–58. 
 113. Id. at 155. 
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give a rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach 
to others less concretely clothed.”114 
In the companion New York City case, Holmes made short work of 
the claim that to compel a landlord to rent to a tenant at a controlled price 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment.115 He wrote: 
It is true that the traditions of our law are opposed to compelling a 
man to perform strictly personal services against his will even when 
he had contracted to render them. But the services in question alt-
hough involving some activities are so far from personal that they 
constitute the universal and necessary incidents of modern apart-
ment houses.116 
Justice McKenna, who was often Holmes’s rival on the Court, vigorously 
dissented in both decisions, joined by Chief Justice White and Justices 
McReynolds and Van Devanter.117 To McKenna, the text of the Constitu-
tion itself clearly answered all the legal questions in the two cases,118 and 
the majority had started down a very slippery slope. “The facts are sig-
nificant,” McKenna claimed.119 He then asked rhetorically, “[H]ave con-
ditions come not only to the District of Columbia embarrassing the fed-
eral government, but to the world as well, that are not amenable to pass-
ing palliatives, so that Socialism, or some form of Socialism, is the only 
permanent corrective or accommodation?”120 McKenna added, “It is in-
deed strange that this court, in effect, is called upon to make way for it 
and, through the instrument of a Constitution based on personal rights, 
and the purposeful encouragement of individual incentive and energy, to 
declare legal a power exerted for their destruction.”121 By 1924, even 
Holmes was skeptical as to whether the District of Columbia could con-
                                                     
 114. Id. 
 115. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921). 
 116. Id. Holmes added that the services required of the landlord were “analogous to the ser-
vices that in the old law might issue out of or be attached to land.” Id. 
 117. Block, 256 U.S. at 158 (McKenna, J., dissenting); Marcus Brown, 256 U.S. at 199 
(McKenna, J., dissenting). 
 118. Block, 256 U.S. at 159 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (“The grounds of dissent are the explicit 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States; the specifications of the grounds are the irresisti-
ble deductions from those provisions and, we think, would require no expression but for the opposi-
tion of those whose judgments challenge attention.”). 
 119. Id. at 162 (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. McKenna’s overheated dissent also proclaimed, “A contract existing, its obligation is 
impregnable,” id. at 163, and the dissenters went on to warn, “Contracts and the obligation of con-
tracts are the basis of [the nation’s] life and of all its business, and the Constitution, fortifying the 
conventions of honor, is their conserving power. Who can foretell the consequences of its destruc-
tion or even question of it?” Id. at 168. 
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tinue to claim World War I emergency conditions as a basis for its rent 
control measures.122 
In Coppage v. Kansas,123 however, Holmes dissented from the 
Court’s decision invalidating the attempt by a progressive Kansas legis-
lature to prohibit employers from demanding “yellow-dog contracts,” 
which were contracts that required employees to promise not to join any 
union.124 In dissent, Holmes noted that it was reasonable for a workman 
“not unnaturally” to believe that “only by belonging to a union can he 
secure a contract that shall be fair to him.”125 Holmes asserted further, “If 
that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it 
seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the 
equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract be-
gins.”126 
By 1937 in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,127 Chief Justice 
Hughes proclaimed for a 5–4 majority that 
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position 
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless 
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their 
health and well being, but casts a direct burden for their support up-
on the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers 
are called upon to pay.128 
This bold, broad statement by the Court in upholding minimum wages 
for women was accompanied, however, with considerable overt paternal-
ism.129 Indeed, paternalism generally may be said to be at the heart of 
those judicial decisions that question or invalidate individual contracts as 
                                                     
 122. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). 
 123. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Justice Pitney’s majority opinion declared, “No doubt, wherever the 
right of private property exists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally 
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances.” Id. 
at 17. 
 124. See id. at 9. 
 125. Id. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Day also dissented, joined by Justice Hughes. Id. 
at 27, 42. 
 126. Id. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 127. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 128. Id. at 399. 
 129. Id. at 398 (“What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women and their 
protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers? And if the protection of women is a 
legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said that the requirement of the payment 
of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an admissi-
ble means to that end? The Legislature of the state was clearly entitled to consider the situation of 
women in employment, the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining 
power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of 
their necessitous circumstances.”). 
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coercive.130 The same might be said on a larger scale concerning some of 
the Court’s decisions to protect states from themselves, even when states 
had the advantage of lawyers who had not objected to the obligations 
undertaken. 
But there is paternalism and then there is paternalism. 
E. Duress and Contract Law 
Robert Hale, a remarkable legal realist and precursor of the law and 
economics movement, once wrote: 
What in fact distinguishes this counterfeit system of “laissez faire” 
from paternalism is not the absence of restraint, but the absence of 
any conscious purpose on the part of the officials who administer 
the restraint, and of any responsibility or unanimity on the part of 
the numerous owners at whose discretion the restraint is adminis-
tered.131  
As Barbara Fried makes abundantly clear in her excellent book about 
Hale that places his thought among the progressive thinkers of his time, 
many critical thinkers began a century ago to recognize that coercion is a 
malleable and ultimately often misleading concept.132 Hale himself wrote 
what remain some of the best discussions ever about the slippery issue of 
“coercion” and what he believed to be the fallacy of state action.133 
A basic point made by Hale and several of his contemporaries was 
that claims of coercion ought not to be separated from underlying ine-
qualities.134 To wrestle with that fundamental inequality, however, is to 
begin to sense how overwhelming it could be to take seriously legal limi-
tations on “voluntary servitude.” Law students still learn in their first 
                                                     
 130. Soifer, The Paradox, supra note 5. 
 131. BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND 
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 50 (1998) (quoting Robert Hale, Economic National-
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 134. See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
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year that American tradition and case law do not permit equity to require 
specific performance, which is largely explained in terms of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.135 Good law teachers also help their students under-
stand that there are multiple means that can achieve the same goal, often 
through only slightly more subtle forms of legally permissible coercion. 
It is understood by many people that, at its core, the very act of 
making a contract restricts the liberty of the parties.136 In fact, this is a 
central purpose of the contractual commitment.137 Further, standard con-
tract law acknowledges in rare situations that a contract can be so one-
sided or unfair that it should not bind a party to it, even if she agree to its 
terms.138 Contracts of adhesion, promissory estoppel, and unconscionable 
contracts are doctrinal examples that continue to curse or delight virtual-
ly all first-year law students in American law schools. 
It also may be that their professors tend to believe these and related 
concepts are underutilized and undertheorized, particularly when they 
consider the problematic congruence of the ability to contract and per-
sonal autonomy that has dominated American legal thought for well over 
a century. It may shock those not exposed to the curses and delights of 
law school that a breach of one’s contract generally is provocatively de-
scribed as neither inherently immoral nor even inefficient.139 Nonethe-
less, the very voluntary nature of contracts remains an article of faith 
among most American lawyers and judges as well as within the general 
public. 
                                                     
 135. See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1033 (7th ed. 2012) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. a. 
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810 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:787 
In the years surrounding World War II, however, several leading 
contracts law scholars joined Hale in stressing that realism about coer-
cive pressures ought to pierce the veil of free will that is central to basic 
assumptions about contract law. Edwin Paterson, for example, wrote: 
The attempt to solve legal problems by the touchstone of “free 
will,” by postulating an individual will insulated from its social en-
vironment, only serves to obscure the genuine problems of ethics 
and policy. If a man is deemed not to “consent” because he was in-
duced by pressure outside himself, then consent becomes a useless 
concept in the administration of justice.140 
Further, John Dawson’s tour de force review of the historical roots of 
various facets of the doctrine of duress pointed out that earlier, “[i]t was 
not yet fully recognized that the freedom of the ‘market’ was essentially 
a freedom of individuals and groups to coerce one another, with the 
power to coerce reinforced by agencies of the state itself.”141 In addition, 
Dawson agreed with Hale that, even in physical duress cases, “courts had 
been slow to realize that the instances of more extreme pressure were 
precisely those in which the consent expressed was more real; the more 
unpleasant the alternative, the more real the consent to a course which 
would avoid it.”142 
Nonetheless, Dawson remained pessimistic about reality actually 
prevailing in judicial consideration of duress.143 He also expressed great 
doubt about the emergence of any doctrinal coherence, beyond his urging 
that actual effect and perceived motive ought to enter judicial deci-
sions.144 In Dawson’s view, it ought to be enough to constitute duress if a 
party to a contract faced overwhelming circumstances; such a contract 
should not be considered truly voluntary without a great deal of specula-
tion about the concept of free will.145 As Holmes once noted for a unani-
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mous Court, “It always is for the interest of a party under duress to 
choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that the choice was made ac-
cording to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of du-
ress properly so called.”146 
In recent years, unfortunately, most legal analysis and the bulk of 
mainstream judicial opinions seem to move further and further away 
from the hard-nosed insights of such legal realists concerning context 
and consent.147 Whether it is mandatory arbitration148 or a vast variety of 
frauds that are perpetrated against consumers,149 the free, knowing, and 
voluntary consent of the individual is blithely assumed, often beyond any 
challenge whatsoever. Ironically, then, there appears to have been many 
recent instances of judicial activism that intervene on behalf of deference 
to both the states and the status quo.150 If anything, the stagnation of 
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wages and the numbing uncertainty of employment opportunities, for 
example, make judicial disregard for the sharp edges of “voluntary servi-
tude” particularly foreboding. States may escape bad deals, but individu-
als remain bound by them. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourteenth Amendment sword meant to afford protection for 
vulnerable individuals has been sheathed and locked away; license to 
carry is facilely denied to the federal government. The Court’s glib invo-
cation of “federalism” now creates an invisible ring around the states that 
will protect them, even from themselves, whenever a majority of the Jus-
tices agree to summon its special magic. By contrast, the federal shield 
for individuals that was eloquently described by the Court in earlier 
times has been pierced or knocked away by a majority of the Justices on 
numerous occasions. 
We still have on the books a federal ban on all voluntary as well as 
involuntary service that amounts to peonage, whether for debt or other-
wise. The contemporary task of realizing the hoary promise of free labor, 
currently codified as 42 U.S C. § 1994, remains open-ended, if not down-
right scary. Nonetheless, legal intervention to prevent the exploitation of 
vulnerable workers was at the core of Thirteenth Amendment guarantees. 
The post-Civil War Amendments and the several statutes anchored with-
in their Enforcement Clauses surely were not deferential to states’ rights 
and state sovereignty. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have 
turned whatever originalism may be found in the enactments of the post-
Civil War era upside down. As a matter of current constitutional law, 
paradoxically, the federal government must not coerce states or state of-
ficials, and yet it can much more easily force individual citizens to do its 
will. 
What it is to be free to contract for one’s labor is necessarily con-
textual and mushy. Yet the same can be said about many other overarch-
ing legal concepts such as liberty, property, equality, and even who legal-
ly can be said to be a reasonable person; nonetheless, we invoke and de-
velop these legal tropes readily and regularly. It is time to begin to do the 
same for the vital idea of free labor. 
Any worthwhile journey requires a start. 
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